■At the Headquarters of the Eighth Route Army, breaking into the Japanese traffic line was the consensus of many Eighth Route Army generals
In May 1940, the Japanese army launched Zao (Yang) The Battle of Yi (Chang), captured Yichang on June 12, strangling the throat of the river. At the same time, it sent hundreds of planes to bomb Chongqing, dropped more than 2,000 tons of bombs, and threatened to attack Chongqing, Kunming, and Xi’an. In addition to using force to force Chiang Jieshi to submit, the Japanese army also lured Chiang into surrender. Chiang Kai-shek is also preparing to hold talks with Sakagaki Seishiro in Changsha. For the Eighth Route Army, Chiang Kai-shek not only stopped paying military expenditures, but also frequently created friction. After the first anti-communist climax was defeated, he instead raked in a rake, spreading rumors that the Eighth Route Army was”guilty but not attacking,” not attacking the Japanese army, but only attacking friendly forces, and charged the Eighth Route Army with friction. Some people who did not know the truth also had doubts about the Eighth Route Army.
At this time, the Japanese army shifted its focus to North China and implemented”security enhancement.” The new commander of the Japanese Army in North China Tada Hayao is a”China Master”. He believes that North China is the key to solving the”China Incident”, but the premise is to”suppress” the Communist army, so he invented the”bull knife” tactics of”sweeping by divisions, decentralized deployment, and flexible advancement”. Before the Hundred Regiments Battle, the division of North China had taken shape. Fortresses everywhere connected railways, roads and canals in Shandong, Hebei, and Shanxi. In Tatian Hayao’s eyes, the Eighth Route Army could not”swim”.
After the Lugouqiao Incident in 1937, the Kuomintang and the Communist Party cooperated for the second time. The main force of the Chinese Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army was reorganized into the Eighth Route Army. Zhu De was the commander-in-chief, and Peng Dehuai was the deputy commander-in-chief. There were three divisions, 115, 120, and 129. Departed for the Shanxi Anti-Japanese Front Line. In October 1939, the Eighth Route Army headquarters moved to Wangjiayu, the eastern mountainous area of Wuxiang County, Shanxi. At the end of the year, Cheng Zihua, political commissar of the Jizhong Military Region, and Sun Zhiyuan, director of the Political Department, called in, thinking that the enemy’s recent road construction was different from the past, and suggested that the enemy should not be allowed to build the road, otherwise it would cause extreme difficulties in guerrilla warfare.
In April 1940, Zhu De and Peng Dehuai discussed the recent combat situation:Although the situation in North China was treacherous, the Japanese troops were battalion, which caused the main lines of communication to become empty and formed the enemy’s rear. Moreover, a Japanese army garrisoning Shanxi was transferred to central China to participate in the Yichang operation, which formed a favorable fighter opportunity.
Nie Rongzhen, then commander and political commissar of the Jinchaji Military Region, recalled that in the spring of 1940, he led the South Detachment of the Jinchaji Military Region to Southeast Shanxi. Peng Dehuai, Zuo Quan and him, as well as Liu Bocheng, Deng Xiaoping, Chen Geng, Chen Xilian, Li Da, etc. have repeatedly discussed the war situation in North China and the combat operations of our army. It is agreed that in this situation, it is difficult to open the situation without a few big victories. It is even more imperative for the North China base areas to break the traffic lines on a large scale.
In modern wars, traffic wars occupies an important position. According to incomplete statistics, from September 1937 to May 1940, there were 1,230 road breaks in North China, covering 3,313 kilometers. From April to August 1940, before the Hundred Regiment War, Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping in the Jinjiyu base area were actively engaged in traffic struggles, forcing the Lin-Han Railway to be suspended, and the planned Han-Ji Railway could not be started. Bai Jin It took more than a year to repair the railway to Xiadian Town, and the Deshi Railway was also delayed. Nie Rongzhen and He Long are also actively breaking the road. However, if we want to fully crack down on the Japanese military’s”cage policy”, it is best to conduct a complete destruction of the entire North China joint operation.
Before Nie Rongzhen returned to the north, Peng Dehuai and Zuo Quan held a banquet to see off at the Eighth Route Army headquarters. Liu Bocheng, Deng Xiaoping, Li Da, Chen Geng, Chen Xilian and others were accompanied. During the dinner, everyone talked about cooperation between the two districts. Deng Xiaoping said that traffic struggle has become one of the main forms of military struggle between our army and the Japanese army. 60%of all struggles in our region are traffic wars. Nie Rongzhen said that since the beginning of this year, the Japanese army has relied on Pinghan Road to expand eastward and has successively built the main roads and branch lines from Shijiazhuang to Nangong, Neiqiu to Julu, Xingtai to Weixian, Handan to Daming, dividing our southern Hebei base into many small branches. At the same time, the Japanese army is also actively building strongholds and highways on both sides of Pinghan Road to strictly seal the traffic between Taihang and southern Hebei, in an attempt to narrow the scope of our army’s activities. Liu Bocheng said that the Japanese army is now stepping up to repair roads and digging trenches on both sides of Pinghan Road and Jinpu Road. These not only have military significance, but also have political, economic, and cultural significance. The enemy organizes them from a strategic perspective. Traffic. Peng Dehuai said that without destroying the enemy’s path, we will not be able to move on our own, and it will be difficult for us to gain the initiative while passive.
Someone suggested that the Zhengtai Road that runs across the two sections should be eliminated so that the Jinjiyu and Jinchaji base areas should be connected together. The Zhengtai Railway, from Shijiazhuang, Hebei to Taiyuan, Shanxi, has a total length of more than 200 kilometers, traversing east and west, splitting the Taihang Mountains into two halves. Along the way, there is Tianxian Niangziguan, and there are Yangquan and Jingxing coal mines, the important fuel bases of the Japanese army in North China. Large and small cities and towns along the line are stationed with heavy soldiers, outlying strongholds are built on both sides of the road, and armored vehicles are patrolling. The Japanese army boasted that this is a”steel blockade.” If it is cut off, it is like a snake hitting it to seven inches. It will not only interrupt the Japanese transportation and supplies in Shanxi, but also benefit the military and economic communication between our two strategic areas. Nie Rongzhen fully agreed with the attack on Zhengtai Road. He said, this is what we often carry out in guerrilla warfare. We are attacking almost every day. There is nothing wrong with this. If this plan is realized, of course it will be good. However, we want to completely control Zhengtai Road, or completely destroy it, which is not realistic enough. Judging from the technical strength of the Japanese army, it will soon be repaired.
This time, it was agreed to carry out a major attack on Zhengtai Road. Peng Dehuai and Zuo Quan agreed that in order to strive for a more favorable development of the war situation in North China and influence the situation of the war of resistance across the country, they were determined to take the Zhengtai Road.
Subsequently, Zhu De and Peng Dehuai issued orders to carry out a general attack on the main communication lines of the Japanese army. The attack time was set for April 10. Specific deployment:The Ministry of Nie Rongzhen was responsible for the attack on Jinpu, Pinghan and Zhengtai Road north of Cangshi Road, the Ministry of Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping were responsible for the attack on the Shijiazhuang to Cixian section of Pinghan Road and the northern section of Baijin Road, and the Ministry of He Long was responsible for the attack on Tongtong Road. In the northern section of Pu Road, Xu Qiangxiang was responsible for breaking Jiaoji Road and Jinpu Road.
■The Eighth Route Army’s deputy chief of staff Zuo Quan conveyed Peng Dehuai’s campaign vision:the main target is set on Zhengtai Road
The combat order has just been issued. Mao Zedong urgently telegraphed. The current situation is quite severe. Chiang Kai-shek has made up his mind, that is, to hang up the sign of the War of Resistance and do”suppression of the Communist Party”. At present, the biggest threats to me are Suide and East Anhui. Mao Zedong asked He Long’s 120 division to return to Yan’an as soon as possible, and then draw another 30,000 to 40,000 people to gather south to open up contact with Chen Yi of the New Fourth Army. In this case, the plan for the raid had to be temporarily put down. At the end of April, Zhu De was ordered to go to Luoyang to talk with Wei Lihuang about stopping the friction, and then to Yan’an. The Eighth Route Army in North China was actually commanded by Peng Dehuai . Peng Dehuai asked Zhu De to report to Mao Zedong in detail his thoughts on preparing for a major battle after arriving in Yan’an. Zhu De urged Peng Dehuai to conduct further research and solicit the opinions of Nie, Liu, Deng, He and others to further improve the plan for the attack.
The Japanese army assembled heavy troops in Kaifeng, northern Henan and southern Shanxi and threatened to attack Xi’an and Lanzhou. Chiang Kai-shek’s position became more shaken, which strengthened Peng Dehuai’s determination to attack. He later said that in order to cooperate with the friendly forces in southern Shanxi and central China, defend the Northwest, break the Japanese conspiracy to destroy our North China Anti-Japanese base area, strengthen the confidence of the people across the country in the victory of the war, and realize the central government’s”overcoming difficulties, overcoming surrender, and fighting For the task of”turning the situation for the better”, we must organize a large-scale raid campaign behind the enemy in North China to connect the three base areas in North China (Northwest Shanxi, Jinchaji, and Southeast Shanxi).
On June 27, the headquarters of the Eighth Route Army moved to Zhuanbi Village, Wuxiang County. Peng Dehuai spent a long time thinking in front of the map every day.
In mid-July, Zuo Quan, deputy chief of staff of the Eighth Route Army, was entrusted by Peng Dehuai to visit Tancun, where the division headquarters of the 129 division is located. , To convey Peng Dehuai’s campaign vision, and prepare to launch an offensive campaign to break the Japanese traffic lines and strongholds, with the main goal set on Zhengtai Road. Jointly implemented by the Jinchaji base area and the 129 division, and coordinated operations on the Pinghan, Tongpu, Baijin, Pingsui, Jinpu, and Beining lines. The 120th Division and all troops along the railway participated in the war.
The Eighth Route Army headquarters decided to start preparations in early July. In early August, when the green yarn tents were vigorous, the enemy’s”mopping up” of Jinchaji, northwestern and southeastern Shanxi was more relaxed, and there was a relatively empty and advantageous fighter along Zhengtai Road. A massive attack on Zhengtai Road. The 22 regiments were originally scheduled to attack Zhengtai Road, followed by attacks on Pinghan Road, Tongpu Road, and Baijin Road; and planned to attack the enemy’s various lines of communication around August 13. It is estimated that when the large-scale raid begins, the Japanese and puppet forces will retreat quite a bit. Therefore, the deployment of our military districts and military divisions should be prepared in advance to eliminate the enemy as much as possible, destroy the bunker and block the ditch (wall).
In the early morning of July 22, Peng Dehuai and Zuo Quan signed an expedited telegram”Combat Preparation Order” and sent a copy to the Central Military Commission. The order is for the purpose of cutting off traffic on Zhengtai Road, preparing food and raiding equipment for one month, and it will be completed by August 10. On July 23, the Headquarters of the Eighth Route Army issued”Regarding the Key Points of Reconnaissance in the Battle of Zhengtai Road”, centering on the Zhengtai Road, especially the Jingxing and Shouyang sections, and on the Pinghan line between the north and south of Shijiazhuang and the Tongpu line between the north and south of Yangqu. , Baijin Line, Pingxi and Liao Lines (referring to the highway connecting Shanxi Pingding, Xiyang, Heshun to Liao County) should also be reconnaissance.
On August 8, the Eighth Route Army headquarters issued the”Campaign Operation Order”. The launch time of the campaign was changed to August 20, and specific tactical requirements were issued. The outcome of the campaign mainly depends on the degree of damage to Zhengtai Road. Therefore, breaking the road is the most central part of this battle. In addition to attacking Zhengtai Road, extensive attacks on railways and highways such as Pinghan Road, Beining Road, Jinpu Road, Shide Road, and Cangshi Road were also necessary to prevent the enemy from increasing reinforcements on Zhengtai Road.
Nie Rongzhen and Liu Bocheng have no big problems, but He Long, the commander of the 120th Division, feels a little powerless. The headquarters required the 120th Division to place its main forces in the north and south of Yangqu and break down Tongpu Road north of Pingyao. He Long believes that although the Jinsui base area is larger than the Taihang and other base areas, its military strength is only half of the Taihang base area. It is indeed difficult to draw four to six regiments to participate in the Zhengtai line. After receiving the telegram from He Long, Peng Dehuai decided to adjust the battle deployment of the 120th Division, placing the main force south of Yuci, concentrating his forces to destroy the Tongpu Road from Yuci to Pingyao, and cooperating with the brothers to attack Zhengtai Road.
He Long and Guan Xiangying believe that it is of course good to stop Japanese reinforcements on Zhengtai Road directly in the north and south of Yangqu, but the troops are too tired. In February, he returned to northwest Shanxi from Jizhong. Before he had a firm foothold, he caught up with the Japanese army’s spring”mopping up”, fighting for 38 days. Immediately after June, there was a summer”mopping” with more Japanese troops. It lasted for 58 days. The 120th Division fought 251 consecutive battles against the enemy, but it never got a good rest. The long-distance southward advance was a lot of difficulties. Moreover, the main force of the Japanese army was stationed in Yangqu, seeing Zhengtai Road as a lifeline, and it must be fully reinforced. Whether the 120th Division can completely block the Japanese army is not very sure. Once unable to stop it, it will be very detrimental to the attack on Zhengtai Road. If the attack is carried out on the northern section of Tongpu Road and troops are used north of Yuci, the attack will be focused on the Tongpu Road from Xinxian to Shuoxian and the highway from Xinxian to Jingle. The method of encircling Wei and rescuing Zhao will be used to grab the cow’s tail and move towards It might be better to stab the enemy in the ass. After reporting to the headquarters, it was affirmed.
The 129th division commander Liu Bocheng and political commissar Deng Xiaoping decided that the battle was commanded by Chen Geng, Chen Xilian, and Xie Fuzhi. Liu Bocheng explained to the headquarters that he should think more about the difficulties, make preparations more thoughtful, and highlight the three aspects of reconnaissance, spy prevention, and technology and tactics. Before the official order is issued, all battle preparations can be made in advance. Because this battle is different from the past, there are many technical tactics, such as blasting and power grid cutting, which must be trained in a targeted manner. On August 18, Liu and Deng held a combat meeting at the command post in front of Shiguai Town, Heshun County to assign tasks to the participating troops. On August 20, Liu and Deng led the front command post to Mingshuitou, south of Guangyang.
A few days before the start of the battle, Nie Rongzhen led a capable command team to Honghecao, a small mountain village near Jingxing. Because the secrecy work is done well, the enemy is always kept in the dark for such a big move.
■The number of troops participating in the battle has changed from 22 regiments to 105 regiments. Peng Dehuai said that no matter how many regiments there are, just call it the”Hundred Regiments Battle”.
On August 20, the weather was extremely sultry and it started to rain in the afternoon. The troops crossed the mountain path in the rain and arrived at the designated position before dusk. At 20 o’clock, a general attack was launched across Zhengtai Road. Nie Rongzhen’s memories are really spectacular! Red flares rose into the sky, piercing the night sky, and assault troops from all directions descended like tigers, rushing toward enemy stations and strongholds. Thunderous explosions, one after another, resounded across the entire Zhengtai Road.
Tongpu, Baijin, Pinghan, Jinpu, Beining and many other railways and many highways also ignited at the same time.
All night, Peng Dehuai and Zuo Quan did not leave the war room. At dawn, the battle report came, first from Liu Bocheng, and then the battle report from Nie Rongzhen and He Long came.
Liu Bocheng first reported victory:Chen Geng’s brigade attacked Lujiazhuang in the southwest of Shouyang, and 4 Lianke bunkers, completely wiped out the enemy, completely occupied the station, and destroyed all the railways and bridges within 10 miles west of the station.
At dawn on the 21st, the Jinchaji Military Region won the throat Niangzi Pass on Zhengtai Road. Niangziguan is located at the junction of Hebei and Shanxi provinces. The terrain is dangerous. The Kuomintang army built many fortifications before the Anti-Japanese War. The Japanese army added four large fortresses on this basis, but they could not stand the surprise attack. Another heavy-fist central column of the Jinchaji Military Region was responsible for attacking the Jingxing Coal Mine. It was a fierce battle overnight, and finally broke in at dawn on the 21st. Someone was reluctant to withdraw. Nie Rongzhen immediately called and emphasized that there is no point in occupying Jingxing. It is not a matter of occupying one or two mining areas. The main task is to destroy the enemy and expand our strength. The evacuation is about to evacuate, and the raid mission is completed, and the evacuation is about to move immediately. It was during this battle that our fighter brought out two little Japanese girls from the fire. Nie Rongzhen wrote to the Japanese army and sent the child to the Japanese army.
Shinao Mountain in the southwest of Yangquan is the throat of Zhengtai Road entering the mountain. Controlling it is equivalent to jamming the throat of Zhengtai Road. Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping placed two of the three main brigades here, under the command of Chen Xilian. Liu and Deng repeatedly explained that the outcome of the battle depends on how many railways were destroyed, and the breaking of the road depends on how many days the Shinaoshan line can effectively stop the Japanese army, at least five to seven days.
Tongpu Road East, He Long, Guan Xiangying’s 358 brigade conquered Kangjiahui, the largest stronghold between Xinxian County and Jingle. Because some troops moved slowly, He Long became angry. While praising the 358 brigade, he pointed out that the whole division should overcome all difficulties and fight bravely. If you hesitate to wait and see, flinch from going forward, excuse all kinds of difficulties, and fail to perform the task resolutely, you must be severely punished. The 120th Division cut off the Tongpu Road in a short time, and destroyed the railways and highways from the south of Datong to the north of Taiyuan, as well as the neighboring railways and highways. In the first stage of the raid, the 120th Division launched 163 battles, destroying 50 kilometers of railways, 470 kilometers of roads, and 40 bridges, effectively cooperating with the attack on Zhengtai Road.
After lunch on the 22nd, the combat chief Wang Zhengzhu reported that there were 105 regiments in total. Zuo Quan said, good! This is a big battle. Peng Dehuai said that no matter how many regiments there are, just call it the”Hundred Regiments Battle”. Immediately sent a telegram with Zuo Quan and issued a report, declaring the raid as the”Hundred Regiments Battle.”
The long snake on Zhengtai Road was cut into several sections, and most of the bridges, tunnels, water towers, stations and other buildings were destroyed and suspended for a month. This is the first time that the Eighth Route Army has conducted such a large-scale raid in the past three years after advancing into the enemy. On August 23, the Eighth Route Army Headquarters issued a commendation telegram:
Nie, He, Guan, Liu, Deng:Hundred regiments fight, because all my commanders and fighters are loyal to the Chinese nation and the Chinese people, and brave , Dare to attack, on all communication lines, especially on the Zhengtai Line, has achieved great victories in the preface, and the victory is coming, infinite joy! Special order award.
The Hundred Regiments battle was the head of the battle, and the Japanese troops in North China were suddenly plunged into chaos. Originally, Hayao Tada’s”bull knife” tactics have been effective, but he never dreamed that the Eighth Route Army, which used to shoot and ran away, suddenly came to a large army of knife-to-knife-to-gun to fight? But because of the”bull knife” tactical coverage, he has no soldiers to adjust. It was not until the seventh day of the Hundred Regimental War that the Eastern Wall was demolished and the Western Wall was repaired. Finally, more than 2,000 soldiers were collected and killed in Shijiazhuang. Soon, Hayao Tada was dismissed, and Japan’s dream of quickly solving the”China Incident” went bankrupt.
On August 26, Peng Dehuai and Zuo Quan signed the”Deployment of the Campaign for the Development of Operations on Both Sides of the Zhengtai Line”. When Zhengtai Road cannot continue to fight or has completely completed the tasks of the Zhengtai Campaign, our policy of action, It is necessary to take advantage of the victory to carry out the results of the battle on both sides of the Zhengtai Line to recover some of the enemy’s strongholds deep in the base areas, continue to adhere to the guerrilla warfare on the Zhengtai Line, reduce the enemy’s area and expand the results, and at the same time rest and reorganize with one force. In order to achieve the maximum attack, the first step of the battle was to start with the inside line. When the Japanese army strengthened, the small units concentrated their superior forces to eliminate it, forcing the Japanese army to abandon certain strongholds in the north and south of the Zhengtai Line to rescue the Zhengtai Line. If a large force comes to help, the main force will jump out of the Zhengtai Line and turn to the north and south sides of the railway, looking for the enemy’s weaknesses and fighting again.
On August 27th, Nie Rongzhen deployed the Jinchaji Military Region’s first phase and second phase of combat plan. After that, apart from continuing to break the road, there was no major battle on the Zhengtai Line.
However, the Japanese army will never give up Zhengtai Road, but was knocked out at first. At the end of August, thousands of Japanese troops were attacked by Yuci, Shijiazhuang, and Yangquan, trying to retake Zhengtai Road at all costs. After more than ten days of raids, the Eighth Route Army has become very tired, and is in urgent need of rest and replenishment, and it is difficult to organize a larger-scale battle.
On September 2nd, Peng Dehuai and Zuo Quan issued a telegram”The enemy’s aid to Zhengtai has arrived, and I will implement the second-step policy.” They decided to basically end the traffic raid from September 3rd. On September 10, after receiving instructions from the central government, Peng and Zuo decided to transfer the Hundred Regiment Battle to the second stage and eliminate the fortified battle at the strongholds on both sides of the traffic line. On September 16, the”Operation Order for the Second Phase of the Hundred Regiments War” was officially issued. The second phase of the campaign began on September 20, including the battle of Lai (yuan) Ling (qiu) in Jinchaji, the battle of Liao (county) Yu (she) in southeast Shanxi, and the north-south section of Tongpu Road in northwestern Shanxi. The raid battle, the Ren (Qiu) River (jian) Da (cheng) Sun (Ning) battle in Jizhong, the Deshi Road break raid in Jizhong, etc.
After receiving a telegram from the headquarters, He Long considered that it is time to seize the opportunity of the Japanese army’s dizziness and continue the attack. It is best not to wait for the action together. It is recommended that the 120th Division attack the Tongpu Xinning Section in advance on the 15th. Peng Dehuai agreed, saying that Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping were fighting against the reinforcements on Zhengtai Road. You took this opportunity to break the attack very well (it would be better if it could be a few days earlier).
Originally, Peng Dehuai wanted to expand the results of the battle and connected the three base areas of Jinchaji, Northwestern Shanxi, and Southeastern Shanxi into one piece. However, the enemy’s reinforcements had reached the east and west sides of Zhengtai Road, and Peng Dehuai immediately ordered the troops to move into the occupation. Enemy stronghold. On October 2, the Eighth Route Army headquarters issued the”Explain and Preparations for the Troops after the Second Stage of the Hundred Regiments War,” announcing that the second stage was basically over, requiring all troops to rest and prepare for another large-scale offensive at any time.
In order to retaliate against the Hundred Regiment Wars, the Japanese army deployed a large number of troops to retaliate wildly against the North China base areas and implement the”Three Lights” policy. On October 6, the Japanese army first “swept” the Taiyue and Taihang base areas, and then “sweeped” the enemy’s rear in North China for two months. They wanted to take advantage of the Eighth Route Army’s opportunity to take a break and destroy the entire North China Anti-Japanese Base.
The third phase of the Hundred Regiments War was from October 6th to December 5th, mainly to crush the retaliatory”mopping” of the Japanese army.
On December 10, 1940, the Political Department of the Eighth Route Army Headquarters published the”Summary Records of the Hundred Regiments War” in the Eighth Route Army Military and Political Magazine. On December 21, Zhu De and Peng Dehuai reported the results of the Hundred Regiment War to the KMT’s highest authority through Zhou Enlai and Ye Jianying in the Chongqing Office of the Eighth Route Army. Except for the 115 divisions and the Shandong column, our army participated in all 105 regiments, including 39 regiments in the Jinchaji Military Region, 20 regiments in the 120 division, and 46 regiments in the 129 division, totaling about 200,000 people. In addition, hundreds of thousands of militiamen and the masses participated. The Japanese army and the puppet army have invested more than 200,000 troops. The Hundred Regiment Battles totaled 1,824 battles, killing and wounding 20,645 Japanese and 5,155 puppet troops, destroying more than 470 kilometers of railways, more than 1,500 kilometers of roads, conquering 2,993 strongholds, and more than 260 stations, bridges, and tunnels.
On December 22, Mao Zedong, Zhu De, and Wang Jiaxiang called Peng Dehuai. The Hundred Regiment War should not be publicized to the outside world. Chiang Kai-shek is launching a new anti-communist upsurge. We must use the momentum of the Hundred Regiment War to oppose it.
■The North China Front Command of the Japanese Army referred to the Hundred Regiment War as the”heart-digging war”. In the future, August 20th will be regarded as the”heart-digging war”. War”Shame Day
On October 15, 1940, the Japanese North China Front Army reported to the Army Ministry that the damage to Zhengtai Road was extremely serious and the scale was beyond description. The enemy used methods such as explosion, incineration, destruction, etc., in an attempt to completely destroy important technical equipment such as bridges, tracks, communication networks, and railway station facilities. In the destruction, the covert disguise is extremely clever. Details of the damage:1. The railroad was damaged in various places, starting at midnight on August 20, at the same time as the attack. Yangquan and Shouyang were continuously attacked by the Communists until September 4, which hindered the emergency repair work. 2. The most severe damage was the two bridges 185 kilometers west of Lujiazhuang and 61 kilometers west. The former was bombed and fell, while the latter did not fall, but it is equally difficult to repair. 3. Destroy the railroad tracks, and carry out long-distance destruction at the same time as attacks from various places. Mainly, the sleepers and the railroad tracks were burnt together. Most of the railroad tracks are no longer usable, and some of the railroad tracks are transported to the mainland by many villagers. 4. For workshop facilities, burn down their houses, destroy water towers and pumps. 5. The destruction of communication is to saw the electric pole from the root, cut the electric wire, smash the porcelain vase, and bend the railway electric pole. 6. Judging from the results of the explosion, it is estimated that the cadres had been trained quite beforehand. In addition, the total amount of explosives used by the enemy is about 5460 kg.
The combat record of the North China Front Army of the Japanese Army said:Jingxing Coal Mine and other equipment were completely destroyed. The surprise attack was completely unexpected by our army and suffered heavy losses, requiring considerable time and a lot of funds to recover.
The history of Japanese military warfare openly admits:This is the biggest fierce battle since the outbreak of the Japan-China War, which caused a major blow to our army. The attack was completely unexpected by our army, and the losses were huge, requiring a long period of time and huge sums of money to recover.
In his military summary report in 1941, Hideki Tojo stated that in the 15th year of Showa (1940), the enemy (KMT army) had not yet launched a main counterattack, and only the Communist Army held in North China last year. Large-scale attack. The North China Front Command of the Japanese Army referred to this campaign as the”heart-digging war”, and August 20 will be regarded as the”heart-digging war” shame day in the future. According to the Japanese combat log:
In the face of the CCP’s surprise attack, the North China Front Army has deepened its understanding of the CCP army over time. Around July of the 15th year of the Showa era, the front army had already seen that in North China’s”police security”, the Communist army was the biggest cancer risk, and most of the crusades targeted the Communist army in an attempt to eliminate it. However, the front army believes that the Communist Party’s military power is not yet so strong, and its combat methods are mainly based on guerrilla warfare. In the event of an attack by our army, apart from scattered and fleeing, it is not yet possible to concentrate its troops to attack our army. Therefore, the surprise attack of the Hundred Regiments of the Chinese Communist Party was entirely out of our military’s observations and unexpectedness above, and it was completely exploited. This surprise attack by the Communist army caused a huge impact on the North China Front. Based on this painful experience, our army has re-understood the Communist army.
Japan’s”Chinese Incident Army Combat History” revealed that the density of Japanese troops in North China at that time was 0.37 on average per square kilometer, and each division was scattered in about 200 locations. Taking this Hundred Regiment War as an opportunity, the front army strongly urged the headquarters to increase its strength. Soon, the Japanese army was transferred back to two divisions from Central China and East China, and entered the North China battlefield.
In Chongqing, newspapers rushed to publish news of the Hundred Regiment War, and there was an endless stream of people visiting the Office of the Eighth Route Army in Chongqing. It is generally believed that the victory of the North China attack is of great significance when the battlefields across the country are quite dull.
Chiang Kai-shek in Chongqing was shocked. He did not expect the Eighth Route Army to achieve his strategic intentions. In the winter of 1939, Chiang Kai-shek planned to organize a nationwide winter offensive, requiring all 10 war zones to participate. The task he gave to the second theater was to first cut off the traffic between Zhengtai and Tongpu railways and clear out the enemies in the southern Shanxi triangle. But Yan Xishan, the commander of the Second Theater Command, did not dare to fight the Japanese army at all. He was still far from Zhengtai and Tongpu Road.
To tell the truth, the Hundred Regiments War helped Chiang Kai-shek a lot. The Japanese army shifted its attention to North China, postponed the plan to attack Chongqing, and eased the pressure on the frontal battlefield of the Kuomintang army. It is said that Chiang Kai-shek should applaud the Hundred Regiments Battle, but he was very contradictory. He has always held high the banner of”the Eighth Route Army must first settle the inside”, thinking that the Eighth Route Army is more terrifying than the Japanese. How can he tolerate the Eighth Route Army’s unconscious development to more than 100 regiments? If he congratulates him, it is equivalent to acknowledging that more than 100 regiments of the Eighth Route Army can serve as the supreme commander of the Chinese theater, and he has to express it. On September 4, Chiang Kai-shek signed a telegram commending the Eighth Route Army’s Hundred Regiment Battle. Said that”Your Ministry spied on this good opportunity, categorically attacked, and dealt a severe blow to the enemy, with special awards.” But on October 20th, Chiang Kai-shek sent another secret telegram to absolutely ban the text about the”Hundred Regiments War”.
■The merits and demerits of the Hundred Regiments Battle
On August 30, 1940, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China reported”New China The front page of the newspaper published the news that the Eighth Route Army launched a hundred regiments battle. The North China edition of”Xinhua Daily” and the North China Branch of Xinhua News Agency published the No. 1 report on the Battle of Hundred Regiments, which was published daily, and nearly 400 numbers were compiled and distributed. The daily battles of the Hundred Regiments War became the focus of national attention. Mao Zedong called Peng Dehuai:The Hundred Regiments Battle is really exciting. Can a battle like this be organized once or twice? On September 10, the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China issued”Instructions on Current Trends”, which mentioned that our party’s 500,000 troops actively acted behind enemy lines (especially the battle of the North China Hundred Regiments), which dealt a heavy blow to the Japanese invaders. , Gave the people of the whole country infinite hope. In addition, the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army should organize one or several planned large-scale offensive operations against the enemy in Shandong and Central China in accordance with the precedent of the North China Hundred Regiment Campaign. In North China, the Hundred Regiment Campaign should be expanded.
The streets and alleys of Yan’an are covered with slogans celebrating the victory of the Hundred Regiments. On September 20, a 10,000-person meeting was held in Yan’an to celebrate the victory of the Hundred Regiments War. Leaders such as Mao Zedong and Zhu De attended. Wang Jiaxiang, director of the General Political Department, spoke on behalf of the Central Committee. He spoke highly of the Hundred Regiments Battle:In the fourth year of unprecedented difficulty in the Anti-Japanese War, the Eighth Route Army launched an active counterattack against the Japanese with a hundred regiments, destroying traffic, uprooting strongholds, and destroying the enemy. There is strength and great victory. It defeated the Japanese aggression attempt and the pessimism and disappointment of certain people in our country. It greatly inspired the people of the whole country and made everyone know that victory in the War of Resistance is certain. The conference unanimously passed the”Telegram to Deputy Commander Zhu Peng”, to salute the leaders of the Hundred Regiment Campaign! And expressed cordial condolences to the soldiers of the Hundred Regiments War.
In any case, at that time, whether Yan’an or Chongqing, they all spoke of one word and praised the Hundred Regiment Battle. But with the passage of time, the Hundred Regiment War, like its commander Peng Dehuai, had a tedious fate.
At the Seventh National Congress of the Party in 1945, on the basis of fully affirming the Hundred Regiments War, some kind criticisms were made.
Nie Rongzhen believes that the results of the (Hundred Regiments War) are huge, and in general it should be affirmed. But there are also major deficiencies and problems in the victory. First of all, there was something wrong with the propaganda. This battle was originally a raid on Zhengtai Road and other major communication lines. Later, the brains became more heated, more and more troops were mobilized, the scale of operations became larger and larger, and the battle time was increasing. The longer the propaganda becomes, the battle of hundreds of regiments will become.
Nie Rongzhen recalled:Chairman Mao was very dissatisfied with the propaganda of the Hundred Regiments War. When we went to Yan’an to participate in the rectification, Chairman Mao criticized this incident. There is a legend that this battle was not reported to the Central Military Commission in advance. After checking, before the battle, the Eighth Route Army headquarters reported to the Central Committee a battle plan, saying that it would attack Zhengtai Road on both sides. Attacking Zhengtai Road, or attacking Pinghan Road, is a common occurrence in guerrilla warfare. It can be said that this is a kind of our daily work and does not involve any strategic issues. The Military Commission will not object to such a combat plan. Speaking of a battle of hundreds of regiments, this is a strategic issue. Chairman Mao criticized that such propaganda exposed our strength, caused the Japanese invading army to re-evaluate our strength, and caused the enemy to concentrate on us. At the same time, Chiang Kai-shek increased his vigilance against us. You advertise that 100 regiments will join the war, and Chiang Kai-shek is panicked. He has always had such a mentality, fearing that we will expand our strength behind enemy lines. In his view, our development is a threat to him. Therefore, propagating the Hundred Regiment Wars in this way caused more serious consequences. In addition, in the second stage of the campaign, when it comes to expanding the results, sometimes we forget the policy of fighting behind enemy lines and only focus on the enemy’s strong strongholds. Therefore, we have to pay a relatively high price. This is against the policy of guerrilla warfare.
The Japanese army quickly mobilized a large number of troops back to North China, and implemented a more cruel and vicious”security enhancement” campaign and”three lights” policy. On the one hand, the enemy launched the Pacific War to”purge” the anti-Japanese forces in the rear. On the other hand, the propaganda of the Battle of the Hundred Regiments aroused the enemy’s vigilance and directed the main offensive spearhead at the Eighth Route Army. In 1940, the southeast of Shanxi, the Beiyue district in 1941, and the central Hebei and Taihang districts in 1942. The anti-Japanese base areas in the enemy’s rear area suffered extremely severe damage. When the enemy is strong and we are weak, our army has suffered a lot. Zuo Quan was killed in the Taihang District’s anti-sweeping campaign in 1942. He was the highest general of our army during the War of Resistance. The 129th Division was overwhelmed with tasks and fought too many tough battles. The troops suffered heavy casualties, killing more than 8,000 Japanese and puppet troops, and more than 7,000 themselves.
Xu Xiangqian recalled that when he went to Yan’an, he passed through the Taihang Mountains and met Peng Dehuai at the Eighth Route Army headquarters. At this time, the Hundred Regiment Campaign is underway. President Peng introduced the situation of the campaign. Although we have won many victories, our weapons are not good, and we lack tools to destroy the railway. We encountered great difficulties during the campaign.
Peng Dehuai accompanied Xu Xiangqian to the 129th division division and met Liu Bocheng, Deng Xiaoping, Chen Geng and others. Chen Geng is commanding troops to attack Guan Jianao. Guanjianao is located in the center of Taihang Mountains, only 6.5 kilometers away from Zhuanbi Village, the headquarters of the Eighth Route Army, which is easy to defend and difficult to attack. Peng Dehuai gave the order to die and had to take it. The Japanese machine guns spit countless tongues of fire, and the Eighth Route Army soldiers fell one by one. Liu Bocheng called and said that the loss of the troops was too great, and he suggested to withdraw temporarily and find another fighter. Peng Dehuai became angry and couldn’t get Guan Jianao, so he removed the 129 division designation and decapitated no matter how big or small! After another day of fighting, the enemy was basically wiped out. However, the 129th Division had to withdraw from the Japanese army. The Japanese army was hit hard by this, and the”mopping up” ended hastily.
Infringement must be investigated.