When the CPC Central Committee decided to resist US aggression and aid Korea, Mao Zedong and Lin Biao has different opinions. At that time, Mao Zedong and the Central Committee did consider Lin Biao to lead troops into the DPRK, but they did not go because Lin Biao was in poor health. Later, Peng Dehuai led troops into the DPRK. Later, there were various opinions on this issue, especially after the”September 13″ incident. Most of the opinions were:Lin Biao was negative on the issue of resisting U.S. aggression and aiding Korea, pretending to be sick and not bringing soldiers into the DPRK. This historical situation should be analyzed in depth based on the principle of seeking truth from facts.
Lin Biao actively supported the formation of the Northeast Frontier Defense and recommended candidates for command
after the outbreak of the Korean War Mao Zedong considered that the Northeast region was directly threatened by war and considered the strategic position of the Northeast region was important, and suggested that the central government establish the Northeast Frontier Defense Force. The central leaders all agreed with Mao Zedong’s opinions. Soon, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China decided to use the 13th Corps to form the Northeast Frontier Defense Army as a strategic measure to prevent problems before they happen.
On the afternoon of July 7, 1950, Zhou Enlai presided over a defense conference in Jurentang, Zhongnanhai, to convey the decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and Mao Zedong on the establishment of the Northeast Frontier Defense Force and discuss the defense of the Northeast Frontier. The meeting was attended by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Commander Zhu De, Acting Chief of Staff Nie Rongzhen, Fourth Field Army Commander Lin Biao, Deputy Political Commissar Tan Zheng, Director of the General Political Department Luo Ronghuan and Deputy Director Xiao Hua, Li Kenong, Minister of General Intelligence, Yang Lisan, Minister of General Logistics, Li Tao, Minister of Operations, Xu Guangda, Commander of Motorcycle Armored Forces, Xiao Jinguang, Commander of Navy, Liu Yalou, Commander of Air Force, Teng Daiyuan, Minister of Railway Department of Military Commission , Su Jin, deputy commander of the artillery, etc.
It can be seen from this list of participants that the participants are mainly heads of the three headquarters of the Central Military Commission, the Army, Navy, and Air Force and related arms. As field army leaders, only Lin Biao and Tan Zheng participated in the meeting.
The meeting discussed issues such as the number of troops under the jurisdiction of the Northeast Frontier Defense Force, the number of troops, the establishment of command structures and the selection of leaders, political mobilization and logistical support, vehicle transportation plans, and recruitment of troops. Lin Biao actively supports the formation of the Northeast Frontier Defense Force. At the meeting, he discussed the necessity of forming the Northeast Frontier Defense from the strategic position of Northeast China, China’s strategic goals in the Far East, and China-North Korea relations. At the same time, he elaborated more on the principles of forming the Northeast Frontier Defense. These principles are the formation of the Northeast Frontier Defense Force with the 13th Corps as the backbone. In the future, the Northeast Frontier Defense Force will also be placed in the Northeast as an important military force of China. It can defend China’s Northeast region internally, and can also serve as a strategic deterrent externally and play a role in the international political arena.
On July 10, Zhou Enlai hosted the The second meeting on defense issues. Lin Biao spoke again and talked about his views on the specific issues of forming the Northeast Frontier Defense Force. The general spirit of his speech is:The Fourth Field Army is obliged to give out on this issue, and how many people it needs, how much equipment it needs. After discussion at the meeting, it was decided to transfer the 38th Army, 39th Army, 40th Army and 42nd Army of the 13th Corps from Henan, Guangdong, Guangxi, Hunan, Heilongjiang and other places, with the artillery first. The division, the second division, the eighth division, as well as an anti-aircraft artillery regiment and an engineer regiment, with a total of more than 255,000 people, formed the Northeast Frontier Defense Army. Most of these troops came from the four fields led by Lin Biao. Lin Biao has always appreciated Su Yu very much. He believed that Su Yu had a high military talent. He personally nominated Su Yu as the early head coach of the troops entering the DPRK to lead troops in the Northeast. Considering that Su Yu cannot be appointed to the DPRK position yet, the meeting decided to appoint Su Yu as commander and political commissar of the Northeast Frontier Defense Forces, Xiao Jinguang as deputy commander, Xiao Hua as deputy political commissar, and Li Jukui as logistics commander; the 15th Corps The headquarters formed the Corps, which governed the 38th Army, 39th Army, 40th Army, artillery, armored, engineer and anti-aircraft artillery units. The meeting decided to establish a special command of the Fourth Field Army for centralized command. The above-mentioned units will be under the command of the Fourth Field Army Special Command; for the air force, the Northeast Air Force Command will be established, which is also under the unified command of the Fourth Field Army Special Command. This series of decisions were revised by Zhou Enlai after the meeting and reported to Mao Zedong for approval on the 13th.
From the above decision, it can be seen that Lin Biao attaches great importance to the issue of defending the motherland and firmly supports the formation of the Northeast Frontier Defense Force. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China did agree that Su Yu led the Chinese army to send troops to North Korea in advance when necessary.
But it is a pity that Su Yu is in poor health and cannot go to North Korea to command operations. It can be seen from the recently published”Su Yu Chronicles” that Su Yu was treating illnesses in Qingdao when the central government decided to form the Northeast Frontier Defense Force. After he learned of the appointment of the Central Committee, he was very anxious, so Luo Ruiqing sent a letter to Mao Zedong explaining his physical condition. Mao Zedong wrote his reply on August 8 after receiving his letter. In the reply, Mao Zedong said:”The letter brought by Comrade Luo Ruiqing has been received, and his condition is still serious, and it is very serious. At present, the new task is not very urgent. You can rest at ease until the illness is cured. The rest place, if Qingdao is suitable, is in Qingdao; If Qingdao is not suitable, you can come to Beijing and decide on it.” Previously, Zhou Enlai and Nie Rongzhen considered that Su Yu was treating and Xiao Jinguang and Xiao Hua were unable to serve in the Northeast Frontier Guard for a while, so they jointly wrote to Mao Zedong, suggesting that the Northeast Frontier Guard The army”returns to the commander of Gaogang and the political commissar of the Northeast Military Region”, and then establishes the frontier defense command after Su Yu, Xiao Jinguang, and Xiao Hua arrive. Mao Zedong agreed with them.
Mao Zedong did consider letting Lin Biao go to North Korea to command the Volunteer Army
Mao Zedong has always been We did not relax our vigilance on our national security issues. Under the unified leadership and careful arrangements of the central government, the Northeast Frontier Defense Force’s troop building, weapon replenishment, and material mobilization work has been intensively proceeding. The troops that should be mobilized also went to the Northeast. However, the leadership of the Northeast Frontier Defense Army has not been determined. The team has never been established. In late August, the Korean People’s Army’s southward offensive weakened, a stalemate appeared on the Korean battlefield, and the possibility of a reversal of the battle situation increased. Under this circumstance, Mao Zedong foresaw that it would be impossible for China not to send troops to North Korea. He and Zhou Enlai began to look for new candidates for the commander of the Northeast Frontier Army. Naturally, they thought of Lin Biao.
Why do they think of Lin Biao? There are mainly several factors. First, Lin Biao was the commander of the Fourth Field Army, the first secretary of the Central South Bureau, the commander and political commissar of the Central South Military Region, and the chairman of the Central South Military and Political Committee. When forming the Northeast Frontier Army, most of the troops transferred were from the original four fields. He himself participated in the Northeast. The formation of the border guards is relatively smooth under his command. Second, Lin Biao was talented in the military. At that time, there was Lin Biao in the army. “There were two of the three major battles” (referring to Lin Biao’s participation in the command of the Liaoshen and Pingjin battles), and “half of the battle across the river” (referring to Lin Biao commanded the Western Front Army to cross the river in the Battle of Crossing the River). Third, Lin Biao was very appreciated by Mao Zedong, and Mao Zedong had such an evaluation of Lin Biao:Lin Biao fought hard and fiercely. Fourth, sending troops to North Korea must cooperate with North Korean leaders and Soviet military advisers. During his stay in the Northeast, Lin Biao fought together with the leaders of the Korean Party. Many senior generals of the Korean People’s Army were Lin Biao’s subordinates. During the period of treatment in the Soviet Union, he had a good relationship with senior generals of the Soviet army. Fifth, to resist US aggression and aid Korea must fight in winter, and Lin Biao has experience in commanding large forces in winter operations. In short, Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai believed that Lin Biao was the most suitable candidate to lead his troops into the DPRK.
Mao Zedong had exchanged views with several secretaries of the Central Secretariat on the plan to send Lin Biao to North Korea to command operations, and several secretaries of the Central Secretariat also agreed. The central government has also brewed in a certain range. After discussing with Zhou Enlai, who was in charge of the daily work of the Central Military Commission, Mao Zedong consciously contacted Lin Biao with more information about the preparations of the Northeast Frontier Guards for going abroad and information from the Korean battlefield. Other central leaders such as Peng Dehuai, Vice Chairman of the Military Commission, Nie Rongzhen, Acting Chief of General Staff, Gao Gang, Vice Chairman of the State, Bo Yibo, Deputy Director of the Finance and Economics Committee of the State Council, are also aware of this matter. However, the central government has not formally discussed this matter, nor has it made a formal decision about it, and naturally it has not formally discussed this matter with Lin Biao.
On September 15th, the U.S. Army landed in Incheon. The Korean People’s Army fell into a passive situation. The U.S. Army took the opportunity to accelerate to the north of North Korea. The U.S. reconnaissance aircraft has flown over the northeastern region of my country for reconnaissance. Obviously, China’s national security has been threatened. Mao Zedong recognized the urgency of sending people to North Korea, and he instructed the Northeast Frontier Army to speed up preparations for sending troops to North Korea. At the same time, Mao Zedong couldn’t help but consider determining as soon as possible the head coach who led the volunteers into the North Korean war.
Lin Biao disagrees with China sending troops to North Korea
However, Mao Zedong apparently considered Lin Biao’s physical condition, and he did not directly order Lin Biao to go to North Korea to lead troops to fight. Seek Lin Biao’s opinion.
In late September 1950, Mao Zedong had a long talk with Lin Biao on the issue of China’s sending troops to the DPRK to participate in the war. During the conversation, Lin Biao spoke frankly about his disagreements on sending troops to North Korea from two aspects:China’s domestic situation and military strength. He believes that our civil war has just ended and all aspects of work are not ready. The United States is the largest industrial power, and its military equipment is highly modernized. Each army has 1,500 artillery pieces, while our army has only 36 pieces. The United States has a powerful air force and navy ships, but our navy and air force have just begun to form. In a situation where the enemy’s equipment is extremely disparity between ourselves and the enemy, if we send troops rashly, we will inevitably burn our bodies, with disastrous consequences. His opinion is that China can send heavy troops to station in the northeast, on the one hand to defend the Chinese border, on the other hand, it can serve as a strategic support force for the Korean People’s Army, and the Korean People’s Army will continue to fight with the US military in guerrilla warfare.
Lin Biao’s opinions to Mao Zedong are straightforward Mao Zedong does not blame Lin Biao for this, but Mao Zedong cannot accept his opinions. At this time, Mao Zedong’s determination to send troops to North Korea has been made. However, Mao Zedong considered that Lin Biao was the leader he and the comrades of the Central Secretariat initially planned to lead troops to fight abroad. He did not approve of sending troops to North Korea. There are bound to be many obstacles when performing combat missions to North Korea, which will affect the resistance to US aggression and aid to North Korea. The overall situation of the battle. Therefore, Mao Zedong did not talk to Lin Biao about sending him to the DPRK.
Since then, Mao Zedong has made long talks with Lin Biao many times, but the main content of the talk is not to let him lead troops into the DPRK, but to tell Lin Biao why we should send troops, what are the consequences of not sending troops, and what are the advantages of sending troops? Conditions, what countermeasures should be taken against US imperialism, etc. The purpose is to win Lin Biao’s opinion at the Politburo meeting to support sending troops into North Korea to fight. However, Lin Biao still insisted on his opinion in front of Mao Zedong and did not agree to send troops to North Korea. Therefore, Mao Zedong solicited Lin Biao’s opinions on the strategic and tactical issues after sending troops to the DPRK. On this issue, Lin Biao actively offered suggestions. After analyzing the situation of the enemy and us, he came up with various possibilities and proposed some plans for Mao Zedong’s reference. He proposed that after sending troops to the dynasty, he must fight several major annihilation battles to stabilize the battlefield. To this end, it is necessary to concentrate the firepower and concentrate the heavy artillery as much as possible on the several divisions fighting the annihilation war. Mao Zedong admired these opinions of Lin Biao.
Mao Zedong did not blame Lin Biao for his outspoken disapproval of sending troops to North Korea, but he ultimately failed to convince Lin Biao. It should be said that Mao Zedong and Lin Biao differed on whether to send troops to North Korea. Obviously, Lin Biao also knew that Mao Zedong and other leaders of the Secretariat of the Central Committee had the intention of letting him lead troops into the DPRK to fight, and he could not fail to truthfully explain his physical condition. Lin Biao said that he suffers from insomnia every night, his body is weak and sick, and he is afraid of wind, light, and sound. What Lin Biao meant was that his own physical condition did not allow him to lead troops into North Korea to fight. If the central government decides to send troops to North Korea, it would be better to find another candidate to lead troops.
Lin Biao was indeed ill at the time
Lin Biao was indeed ill at the time. Lin Biao was not physically strong when he was young, but after entering the Whampoa Military Academy, his body gradually became stronger due to military training. He was really in poor health, starting after the Battle of Pingxingguan. At that time, Lin Biao was riding a war horse seized from the Japanese army and wearing the coat of the seized Japanese officer. The KMT sentry mistakenly thought it was the enemy. Fang staff, fired after shouting the password. The bullet penetrated Lin Biao’s lungs and scratched his spinal nerves. Although he was treated in the Soviet Union, Lin Biao’s body has since been extremely bad, afraid of light, water, and wind.
During the War of Liberation, when Lin Biao returned to China to take part in major battles, his physical condition was also very bad. In the northeast, Lin Biao suffered multiple illnesses, but still clenched his teeth. To deal with the disease, Lin Biao came up with many strange methods. One is that eating is very simple, only eat two kinds of dishes, stewed tofu with cabbage and stewed tofu with potatoes, no or very little meat. The second is not to take a bath for many years. According to the staff around him, because he has not bathed for many years, his shirt must be changed after two days of wearing it. The shirt after the change is stained with oil. It must be scalded with boiling water and rubbed with alkaline water to clean it. The third is not to live where there is water. Because as long as he heard the sound of running water, he would diarrhea. This is indeed a strange disease left over after a nerve injury. Not only was the authoritative Soviet doctor surprised, but Lin Biao himself was also surprised, but there was really no way.
Lin Biao’s illness does not stop there. Since his nerve was injured, Lin Biao must often smell the smell of the match burning, otherwise he would be drowsy and even have a headache. In addition, he also had a strange but serious illness that he did not know the cause. Sometimes his face suddenly turned pale, his body weakened immediately, and he sweated and gasped sharply. At this time, no drugs or methods can be cured. In the long illness, Lin Biao explored a way to cure the disease, which is to”break the car.” When Lin Biao was in Guangdong, the guards around him recalled this situation:
Ye Qun suddenly shouted in the house:”Hurry up, President Lin is sick!” With this sound, it was not the doctor who ran to Lin Biao. A guard and special”driver” Chen Liangshun was equipped. He didn’t run to the door of Lin Biao’s bedroom to rescue him. Instead, he ran to an empty room in the northwest corner of Lin Biao’s bedroom. There was an old-fashioned bucket motorcycle that was eliminated from the army. The motorcycle is fixed to the wall, and the exhaust pipe extends out of the house. Chen Liangshun jumped on the motorcycle and started immediately. At this moment, Ye Qun and some of Lin Biao’s guards, leaning on Lin Biao, who was wearing a military coat with a pale face and extremely weak body, sat in the seat of the motorcycle. Lin Biao gritted his teeth and endured. Chen Liangshun increased the throttle and the motorcycle trembled violently. Lin Biao whispered:Drive harder! Chen Liangshun increased the throttle again, the motorcycle bumped more violently. At this moment, a miracle happened. Lin Biao’s face became bloody, his clenched teeth were loosened, his closed eyes opened, his expression regained, his eyes released a sharp light again, and his whole body also had strength. After ten minutes, Lin Biao whispered:Okay. He stepped out of the motorcycle and walked slowly back to the office to continue working.
During the War of Liberation, Lin Biao’s body was almost the same as described above. Lin Biao also suffered multiple illnesses during the intense work of commanding the Liaoshen Campaign, the Pingjin Campaign, the Battle of Crossing the River, and the pursuit and annihilation of the KMT Southern Army. After the liberation of the whole country, Lin Biao was appointed to take charge of the military and political affairs of the southern region, and all military and political affairs in the southern region were determined by him. The south is a new liberated area. It is necessary to eliminate the remaining military forces of the Kuomintang in the south, but also to suppress bandits; it is necessary to take over the big cities, restore the economy, establish people’s power, and carry out land reform in the new area. The work is complicated and the tasks are heavy. In order to stabilize the South, Lin Biao did a lot of work. There was a period when he worked day and night, and he ate more simple vegetables. Nutrition became a problem. As a result, his physical condition became worse. Not only did he get more attacks, but he also got more serious. During that period, in the telegram between him and the central government, he talked about his physical condition many times, and the central government was also very concerned about him.
Under such circumstances, Lin Biao went to North Korea to command operations. Not only might his body be unable to withstand the tense command work, but his body might not be able to withstand even living in a foreign country. Therefore, Lin Biao truthfully explained his physical condition to the central government, which is pragmatic, responsible, and conforms to the principles of the organization.
Mao Zedong is very clear about Lin Biao’s illness and he is also very concerned about him
Mao Zedong is very aware of Lin Biao’s illness, and other central leaders are also very clear about it. As early as when Mao Zedong sent Lin Biao to the Northeast, he noticed Lin Biao’s physical condition. He paid special attention to the health of other senior leaders in the Northeast. After Lin Biao took power in the south, Mao Zedong paid great attention to Lin Biao’s physical condition and sent doctors to the south to treat him.
For fear of Lin Biao’s inability to survive in the south, Mao Zedong Lin Biao went to work in Beijing. On the one hand, he participated in major decision-making in the central government, and more importantly, he had good medical conditions. Soon after Lin Biao arrived in Beijing, Mao Zedong entrusted Fu Lianzhang, a health doctor in charge of the health of senior leaders of the central government, to visit Lin Biao. Mao Zedong also instructed Fu Lianzhang to come forward and transfer first-class medical experts from Shanghai, Beijing, and Tianjin to treat Lin Biao specifically. In order to have a unified coordination of this task, Mao Zedong also specially sent Xiao Hua to be responsible for the unified responsibility on behalf of the Central Committee. In 1953, Fu Lianzhang transferred a group of doctors from Beijing, Shanghai and Tianjin to treat Lin Biao specifically. It was the first time in the history of the Chinese Communist Party that Mao Zedong personally came forward to mobilize so many famous doctors, set up an expert group, and sent President Xiao Hua to diagnose and treat a disease for a cadre. The expert team conducted a comprehensive and detailed examination of Lin Biao’s nerves, heart, gastrointestinal, urinary, blood, liver, and lungs, and found that Lin Biao was indeed very weak, but there was no major problem with his organs. They knew that this was a strange disease, and Soviet experts could not cure it. Although they studied many times and came up with various plans, none of them were satisfied by the experts themselves, and they did not help much to cure Lin Biao’s disease. Apart from taking some maintenance measures, Lin Biao had to be allowed to follow the method he invented to relieve the pain. The doctors recommended Lin Biao for long-term rest treatment.
The opinions of the medical team were passed on to the central government through Xiao Hua. Mao Zedong knew that this was the result, and his heart was heavy. However, Lin Biao’s physical condition is like this, and he has no choice but to let him recuperate for a long time.
Mao Zedong was very concerned about Lin Biao’s recovery. For this reason, he also specially copied a poem by Cao Cao,”Turtle Although Longevity” for Lin Biao:
Although the tortoise has a longevity, there is still time.
The snake rides in the fog, and finally becomes dust.
Lao Ji Fu Chi, aspiration for thousands of miles.
The martyrs are in their twilight years and are full of heart.
The period of shrinking is not only in the sky.
The blessing of Yang Yi, you can get eternal years.
Mao Zedong sent this poem by Cao Cao he copied to Lin Biao. Lin Biao was very grateful after reading it.
Lin Biao bluntly disapproved of sending troops to North Korea at the enlarged Politburo meeting
Soon, Mao Zedong decided to hold an enlarged meeting of the Politburo to discuss whether to send troops to North Korea. Since Lin Biao made it clear that he did not approve of sending troops to North Korea, and truthfully explained his physical condition to Mao Zedong, Mao Zedong certainly would not force him to lead troops to North Korea. In fact, before the enlarged meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee was held, Mao Zedong had already given up his plan to send Lin Biao to lead troops into the North Korean war, and had already identified another candidate-Peng Dehuai. At the meeting of the Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee held on October 2, Mao Zedong said:”It is extremely urgent to send troops to aid Korea. Since Lin Biao said he is sick and cannot go, my opinion is that Mr. Peng is the most appropriate.”
October On the 4th, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee held an enlarged meeting to discuss the issue of sending troops to aid North Korea. Those present at the meeting were:Mao Zedong, Zhu De, Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, Ren Bishi, Chen Yun, Gao Gang, Peng Zhen, Dong Biwu, Lin Boqu, Zhang Wentian. Peng Dehuai arrived in the middle of the meeting. Li Fuchun, Luo Ronghuan, Lin Biao, Deng Xiaoping, Rao Shushi, Bo Yibo, Nie Rongzhen, Deng Zihui, Yang Shangkun, and Hu Qiaomu attended the meeting.
The dispatch of troops to North Korea is a major event related to China’s overall situation and national security. In this regard, Mao Zedong adopted a very cautious attitude. He convened an enlarged Politburo meeting to gather ideas, weigh the pros and cons, and at the same time unify the will. Therefore, at the beginning of the enlarged Politburo meeting, Mao Zedong asked everyone to put aside the difficulty of sending troops to the North Korean war.
Lin Biao still insisted in his speech that he talked with Mao Zedong in person—it is not appropriate to send troops to the DPRK. He said:We have just established our country and we are waiting to be revived. Our national strength is very weak and we are unable to fight another big battle. Especially we have not yet competed with the US military. I still have the same opinion:Be cautious. Our country has been fighting for more than 20 years, and our vitality has not yet recovered. I think it is better to strengthen the border defense in the northeast so as not to catch fire. In the next few days of the meeting, Lin Biao spoke again and again, expressing the same opinions, and cited the specific difficulties my country has in sending troops to North Korea. Since his speech has been considered for a long time and has material basis, it has won the approval of many members of the Politburo. At the meeting of the Standing Committee of the Central Military Commission held during this period, Lin Biao discussed his opinions in more detail and analyzed the problems in a specific manner.
Regarding Lin Biao’s attitude at the enlarged Politburo meeting, Lei Yingfu, who served as Zhou Enlai’s military secretary, described it in his own memories. He said:”He said at the Jurentang meeting of the Standing Committee of the Military Commission that in order to save a North Korea with a few million people, it is not worth smashing a China with a population of 500 million. Our army fights Chiang Jieshi The Kuomintang army is sure, but it’s hard to say whether it can beat the U.S. Army. It has a huge army, navy and air force, atomic bombs, and a strong industrial foundation. It’s pressing, it’s enough to hit me with two atomic bombs or use planes to bomb me indiscriminately, which is enough for us. Therefore, he does not approve of sending troops, it is best not to send troops. The policy of”no war” is to garrison troops in northern North Korea and look at the development of the situation. This is the best policy.”
However, Lin Biao’s opinion was still rejected by Mao Zedong. Mao Zedong’s perspective on issues is naturally broader and more comprehensive than Lin Biao’s. He viewed the issue of sending troops to North Korea from the perspective of the international situation and China’s long-term strategy. He believed that troops must be sent to North Korea. His opinion was supported by many members of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee, including Peng Dehuai, another leader. On October 5, the enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee continued to discuss the decision-making issue of resisting US aggression and aid to Korea. Peng Dehuai, who had just traveled to Beijing from Xi’an the day before, said:“It is necessary to send troops to aid Korea. If it is broken, it is at most a few years later than the victory of the Liberation War. If the US military is placed on the bank of the Yalu River and Taiwan, it will launch a war of aggression at any time. You can find excuses.” After listening to Peng Dehuai’s speech, Mao Zedong stood up and said firmly:“Peng said well! There are indeed many difficulties in sending troops to the war, but North Korea is a friendly neighbor of China, and the Chinese people cannot watch the US aggression. Those who trampled it on and ignored it; if the lips were dead, the teeth would be cold, and the house would be in danger. We should participate in the war, and we must participate in the war. The benefits of participating in the war are great, and not participating in the war will cause great harm.” In this way, the issue of sending troops to North Korea is in politics. The decision was made at the enlarged meeting of the Bureau.
After the enlarged meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee made a decision, Lin Biao expressed obedience to the decision of the enlarged meeting of the Politburo, and said this, telling him that the troops in the Fourth Field Army under his original command who were going to enter the DPRK were determined. Support the central government’s decision to resist the US and aid Korea. The enlarged Politburo meeting also finally decided to send Peng Dehuai to lead troops into the DPRK.
For a long time after this, the central government never mentioned Lin Biao’s disagreement with sending troops to North Korea and his inability to bring troops to North Korea due to illness, let alone any differences of opinion between him and Mao Zedong. This is because in the view of the Central Committee, these are normal and do not violate the principles of the party.
Many comrades in the party had the same views as Lin Biao back then
After the outbreak of the Korean War, many comrades in the party had basically the same views as Lin Biao on the issue of sending troops to Korea. Yes:Lin Biao’s disapproval of China’s sending of troops to North Korea was probably formed since the outbreak of the Korean War. It was his fixed view, and once Lin Biao formed his own view, he would not easily change it.
Lin Biao, who has actually been concerned about the Korean War, formed his disapproval of sending troops to Korea in September 1950 at the latest. According to Chai Junwu’s recollection, after returning to Beijing from Pyongyang in early September 1950, he received a notice from the General Office of the Central Military Commission that Lin Biao wanted to see him and learn about North Korea. Chai Junwu immediately went to Lin Biao’s residence to report. Prior to this, Chai Junwu had reported the situation in North Korea to Lin Biao.
After listening to Chai Junwu’s report on the new situation of the Korean war, Lin Biao asked:”Are they ready to go up the mountain to fight guerrillas?” Obviously, what Lin Biao said here refers to the Korean People’s Army and its leaders. .
Chai Junwu replied:”I can’t say exactly that, but according to what I know with Kim Il-sung, if the situation requires him, he can go to the mountains to fight guerrillas.”
Lin Biao asked again:”We don’t send troops. Is it okay to let them go up the mountain to fight guerrillas?”
Lin Biao’s question was actually talking to himself, and it also showed that he was thinking about this issue, or that he was talking about his own views to the lower level. Because Chai Junwu could not answer this question, Chai Junwu did not speak. Lin Biao could understand, and the conversation was over.
From Lin Biao’s conversation with Chai Junwu, it can be seen that Lin Biao’s disapproval of sending troops to North Korea was already clear.
At that time, many comrades in the party agreed with Lin Biao on the issue of whether to send troops to North Korea. This is understandable. Because at that time, China experienced wars and chaos and just stabilized. It can be said to be a waste of time. The Chinese people need peace, and China also needs a period of peaceful construction. From a military point of view, the power of New China is not strong enough, and its weapons and equipment are far behind the US military. At war with the world’s number one military power, it is normal for everyone to hesitate about the possibility of victory, and it is understandable that there are disagreements in the party. Many parties mentioned this aspect in their later memories.
Nie Rongzhen said in his memories:“At that time, there were also different opinions in our party. The main reason is that some comrades believe that we have been fighting for so many years and urgently need rest and recuperation. It has only been a year since the founding of the country. There are many difficulties and it is not a last resort. At that time, it’s better not to fight this battle.”
Bo Yibo also said in his memory:”At that time, I was determined to send troops to fight this war. It was not without risk for the new People’s Republic. , The difficulty is great. I remember that Chairman Mao once talked to me that we do have difficulties. Some comrades do not advocate sending troops. I understand it, but we are a big country. If we don’t fight, we can’t save ourselves. br> Mao Zedong himself also recalled the situation of different opinions in the party at that time, and thought it was normal. On October 10, 1970, when Mao Zedong met with visiting Kim Il Sung in Beijing, he mentioned that the Politburo of the Communist Party of China was hesitant to discuss the issue of sending troops to North Korea because of differences in opinions. He said:”Although we have placed five troops on the Yalu River, our Politburo is always undecided. One flip, one flip, one flip, one flip, um! It was finally decided.” The”translation” mentioned here refers to the situation where the Politburo of the Central Committee had different opinions and repeated arguments during the discussions.
The former Secretary of Mao Zedong, and later the director of the Central Literature Research Office, Comrade Pang Xianzhi wrote in his book”Mao Zedong and Resisting U.S. Aid Korea”:At the enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee held on the afternoon of October 4,”Most people do not approve of sending troops or have all kinds of doubts about sending troops. The main reason is that China has just ended the war and its economy is very difficult and urgently needs to be restored; the land reform in the newly liberated areas has not yet been carried out, bandits and spies have not been eliminated; our army’s weapons and equipment It lags far behind the U.S. military and has no air or sea dominance; among some cadres and fighters, there is a peaceful war-weary idea; we are worried that the war will drag on for a long time and we cannot afford it.
is Mao Zedong, who firmly advocated sending troops to North Korea. In making this decision, he also went through a process of repeated thinking and hesitation. Nie Rongzhen once recalled:”Comrade Mao Zedong also thought about the issue of whether to fight or not, and thought about it for a long time. At that time, the troops had already moved to the Yalu River, and Comrade Deng Hua’s advance team was ready to cross the river, and Comrade Mao Zedong let I sent a telegram to Deng Hua to tell him to slow down, stop again, and consider again and again, before finally making up his mind. Comrade Mao Zedong really thought about this matter repeatedly and painstakingly.” Hu Yaobang also said in his memories. Arrived:When Mao Zedong was considering the issue of sending troops to North Korea, he said,”He didn’t say anything, he didn’t shave for a week, and he stayed so long. After thinking about it, after a meeting, everyone agreed, and Chairman Mao shaved.” Hu Qiaomu, who served as Mao Zedong’s secretary at the time, also recalled:“I have worked with Chairman Mao for more than 20 years. I remember two things that made it difficult for Chairman Mao to make up his mind. One was the dispatch of volunteers to North Korea in 1950, and the other. That is, in 1946 we are ready to completely break with the Kuomintang.”
The above historical materials can show that Lin Biao had earlier formed his disagreement with sending troops to the DPRK to fight, and he insisted on not changing it. He publicly stated his opinion in the party, and when the Central Committee made the decision to send troops to North Korea, he obeyed the Central Committee’s decision. These are not abnormal. Lin Biao was not alone in disapproving of sending troops to aid North Korea. Lin Biao is indeed ill, and it is normal for him to explain his physical condition without the central government making a formal decision. After the enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee, Lin Biao followed Mao Zedong’s opinion and went to Moscow with Zhou Enlai to negotiate with Stalin on the Soviet Union’s assistance to Chinese troops participating in the war in North Korea. During the negotiations, Lin Biao demonstrated to the Soviet Union the CPC Central Committee’s determination to resist US aggression and aid in North Korea, and communicated with the Soviet Union in terms of basic strategy and requirements for weapon support. After the negotiation, Zhou Enlai returned to Beijing, and Lin Biao stayed in the Soviet Union for treatment. After that, Mao Zedong still arranged Lin Biao to hold important positions in the army, and did not express his”disappointment” and”dissatisfaction” with Lin Biao.
In the spring of 1985, the Military Volume of the Encyclopedia of China was in the process of being compiled, and the Encyclopedia Editing Office of the General Political Department of the People’s Liberation Army sent the”Lin Biao” entry to the founding general Huang Kecheng for review. The explanation mentioned Lin Biao’s mistake in disapproving of sending troops on the eve of the War of Resisting the United States and Aid. Huang Kecheng said on this matter:”In the party, a lower cadre reflects his views to the party leadership and puts forward his own opinions. Now it seems that this is a good thing; if you hide your views, Just follow what you say. This is an incorrect attitude. Lin Biao does not conceal his point of view. Although his point of view is wrong, he dares to reflect it to the above. On this point, it shows the attitude of a communist.” He also said:”I consider that if other people’s entry explanations include all these types of questions,’Lin Biao’ can also be written; if you don’t write such questions in other people’s entries, you should not be so harsh on Lin Biao. In our party In the decades of revolutionary struggle, there are no people who have made no mistakes. Those who have not said the wrong thing or done anything wrong may not be able to find one.”
When studying history and evaluating historical figures, we should learn from Huang Kecheng The spirit of seeking truth from facts.
From:Military Soul History